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ABSTRACT:  Many countries have introduced policies to stimulate the production of electricity in a sustainable or 
renewable way. Theoretical and simulation studies provide evidence that the introduction of renewable energy 
promotion policies lead to lower electricity prices as sustainable energy supply as wind and solar have very low or 
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provide additional empirical evidence on how the growth of low marginal costs renewable energy supply such as wind 
and solar influences power prices. We do so indirectly studying Nord Pool market prices where hydro power is the 
dominant supply source. We argue that the marginal costs of hydro production varies depending on reservoir levels 
that determine hydro production capacity. Hydro power producers have an option to produce or to delay production 
and the value of the option to delay increases when the reservoir levels decrease and the option to delay decreases in 
value when reservoir levels increase and producers face the risk of spillovers. Hence, an increase in reservoir levels 
mimics the situation of an increase of low marginal costs renewable energy in a market. Our results show that higher 
reservoir levels, more hydro capacity, lead to significant lower power prices. From this we conclude that an increase 
in low marginal costs renewable power supply reduces the power prices. The second contribution of this paper is that 
we develop a market clearing price model by modelling the supply curve of power that varies over time depending on 
fundamentals such as hydro capacity and the prices of alternative power sources and that deals with maximum prices 
which apply to all power markets that we know. With our result, we strengthen support for the view that an increase in 
wind and solar supply lowers the power price. This is good news for consumers, but it increases the costs of 
sustainable energy policies such as feed-in tariffs and at the same time lowers revenues and profits for power 
producers in case governments would abandon such policies. This effect makes the economic and policy support for 
renewable energy less sustainable. Policy makers have to account for this if they want to stimulate a sustainable 
growth of sustainable energy supply.   
 
 
JEL Codes:  C51, Q41, Q42, Q48 
Keywords:   Energy policies, sustainable energy, market clearing price, supply curve model. 
 
 
Ronald Huisman 
Erasmus School of 
Economics & IEB  
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR, Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands,  
E-mail: rhuisman@ese.eur.nl 
 
Victoria Stradnic 
Erasmus School of Economics  
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR, Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands,  
E-mail: stradnicv@gmail.com 
 
 
Sjur Westgaard 
Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology 
Sentralbygg I 
1153 Alfred Getz vei 3, Trondheim, 
Norway 
E-mail : sjur.westgaard@iot.ntnu.no 
 
 
                                                 
*
 The authors would like to thank Elisa Trujillo-Baute, Stein-Erik Fleten and seminar participants at IEB-University of 
Barcelona for valuable comments. 
1 Introduction
Many countries have introduced policies to stimulate the production of electricity in a sustainable
or renewable way1. The most popular policy is feed-in tariffs that provide green power producers
a guaranteed price for their output. Under this policy, the government compensates a power
producer for the difference between the guaranteed price and the market price of power. This
policy reduces risk for sustainable energy producers and is therefore the most preferred policy
by investors (Hofman and Huisman [2012]). By definition, a feed-in tariff policy becomes more
expensive for a government when power prices decline as producers have to be compensated for a
larger gap between the guaranteed price and the market price. Amundsen and Mortensen [2001],
Jensen and Skytte [2002] and Fischer [2006] provide theoretical evidence that the introduction
of renewable energy promotion policies has lead to lower electricity prices. These lower prices
arise as sustainable energy supply as wind and solar have very low or even zero marginal costs
as no fuel is needed to produce one additional unit of power. An increase of sustainable power
supply in a price competitive energy market then results ultimately in lower energy prices. This
effect introduces the following paradox. A feed-in tariff policy to stimulate sustainable energy
becomes less sustainable in itself as the policy becomes more expensive when it successfully
stimulates growth of renewable energy. Another implication of such a policy leading to lower
power prices is that low energy prices reduce the revenues and profits for sustainable power
producers in the case that a government would abandon the feed-in tariff policy and no longer
compensates producers for the low energy prices. Sustainable energy then becomes less attrac-
tive as an investment opportunity and therefore reduces the supply of private capital to finance
sustainable energy production. The theoretical results that sustainable energy policies lead to
lower energy prices have been confirmed by Sensfuss et al. [2008] and Linares et al. [2008] who
provide insight from simulation studies.
Empirical support for this claim are relatively scarce possible due to a lack of data as it takes a
long time before these policies result in a large enough share of sustainable energy to observe this
effect in market prices. Yet, Sa´enz de Miera et al. [2008], Jonsson at al. [2010], and Gelabert
et al. [2011] have examined the impact of renewables on wholesale electricity prices and provide
empirical prove for the claim. For instance, Gelabert et al. [2011] examine the Spanish market
between 2005 and 2009 and report that a marginal increase of 1GWh of renewable electricity
production and cogeneration yields a 4% decline in electricity prices.
The motivation for this study is to provide additional empirical evidence on how the growth in
production from low marginal costs sustainable energy sources such as wind and solar influences
power prices. We do so by not studying this relation directly such as relating power prices to
wind and solar supply in some model. We take an different route that might provide insight
from an alternative perspective. We focus on hydro power. Hydro producers convert stored
water in reservoirs into power in volumes and at moments that they prefer. This amount of
1We will use the terms sustainable and renewable interchangeably regarding power production, although not
being entirely correct.
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stored water in the reservoirs increase from rain fall, from melting snow or from water pumped
from rivers into the reservoirs. We argue that we can learn about how the market clearing price
changes when more low marginal costs supply is added to the market by examining the variation
in reservoir levels and it’s impact on power prices. We reason that the marginal costs of hydro
power production changes when the reservoir level changes. To see this, we see hydro capacity
as a real option that hydro producers have to convert water into power. They decide to exercise
the option to produce now based on the current power price and the expected opportunity loss
that arises if they would use the water for producing at a later moment when prices might be
higher. Therefore, the marginal costs of hydro power production is in fact equal to the value of a
real option to delay production. This option is very valuable when the reservoir is almost empty.
In this situation the marginal costs of hydro power is high as opportunity losses might be high as
producing now implies an even lower inventory of water. The opposite holds when reservoirs are
almost full. Torro [2007] states that hydro producers sell at lower prices when reservoirs are full
as water may overflow which reduces the potential gains of producers. Hydro power producers
are willing to sell against any (positive) price to prevent loosing water inventory from spill overs.
Otherwise stated, the value of the real option to delay is almost zero. Therefore, the marginal
costs of hydro production is low when reservoir levels are almost full and even zero when reservoir
levels are full. Summarizing, the low marginal cost when the reservoirs are almost full is due to
the low marginal value of water (worst case it must just flow out without any use). When the
reservoirs are low, waiting to tap might be very profitable, hence the alternative cost is very high.
This is particular true when it is a cold winter, when import is needed and coal/gas prices are high.
We believe that the relation between marginal costs of hydro power production and reservoir
levels can be used to examine what would happen to the market clearing price when more power
supply from low marginal costs sources such as wind and solar is added to the market. An
increase in the share of these power sources is comparable to an increase in reservoir levels as
an increase in reservoir levels reduces the marginal costs of hydro production. This methodology
has drawbacks off course as it doesn’t model the direct relation between wind and solar and
energy prices. But the advantage of our approach is that we can learn by studying a mature
market where there has been a major share of hydro production for a long time and therefore our
results will suffer less from any effects due to changes in the supply side of the market. Hence,
we believe that this methodology contributes to the empirical knowledge about the impact of
renewable energy on energy prices. Our goal is therefore to empirically examine how the market
clearing price changes in a market with hydro power when reservoir levels change. And according
to the previous discussion, we expect that the adding more low marginal costs supply to the
market (higher reservoir levels) lowers the market clearing price. To examine this, we construct
a demand / supply model in which the supply curve is modeled as a function of reservoir level.
We choose for this way of modeling instead of a direct (linear) regression analysis because we
expect non linearities as the market clearing price might change due to variation in the level and
convexity of the power supply curve due to variation in reservoir levels, consumption and prices
of alternative power supply. This model is developed in the next section.
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Our results show that variation in reservoir levels significantly change the level and convexity
(price elasticity) of the power supply curve and therefore the market clearing price. For all
consumption levels that we have observed in our Nord Pool sample, we show that an increase in
reservoir level lowers power prices. And from this we conclude that more sustainable low marginal
costs energy supply will reduce energy prices as an increase in reservoir levels is equivalent to an
increase in low marginal costs supply in an energy market.
2 A demand and supply model for electricity
The market price of electricity in day-ahead and intra-day or imbalance markets is the outcome
of the intersection of aggregated demand and supply stack submitted by electricity traders. Bar-
low [2002] and Bozoianu et al. [2005] model electricity market (wholesale) prices by specifying
demand and supply curves and a stochastic demand process. They show that most characteris-
tics of electricity prices, such as mean-reversion, time varying volatility and price spikes, can be
explained by the combination of demand dynamics and the (time varying) structure of supply
and demand curves.
Barlow [2002] assumes that supply is non random and independent of time. This a strong
assumption that does not necessarily apply to electricity markets. For instant, the Nord Pool
market, the market which prices we examine in this paper, depends to a large extend on supply
from hydro producers. The amount of hydro capacity varies over time due to variation in the
level of water available in reservoirs. Reservoir levels depend on rain fall and temperature, which
determines the in-flow of water from melting snow. Hydro power capacity therefore varies over
time and it does so in a forecastable (as weather patterns are forecastable) and stochastic (fore-
cast errors) way. Reservoir levels thus determine supply capacity and it is very likely that the
structure of the supply curve varies over time as a consequence. Bozoianu et al. [2005] make
a similar observation and argue that the structure of the supply curve in the Californian power
market varies over time due to varying capacity of non fuel based power supply, variation in gas
prices, and power plant outages. As we are interested to examine how reservoir levels influence
the market clearing price through the supply curve, we follow Bozoianu et al. [2005] and assume
that supply curve may vary over time in such a way that the shape of the supply curve depends
on available hydro power capacity (reservoir levels).
Barlow [2002] and Bozoianu et al. [2005] model the supply curve as a function of price: the
quantity offered given a price. Barlow [2002] uses a power function to structure the supply
curve and Bozoianu et al. [2005] use an exponential function. We prefer the power function2.
Our preference is based on that power prices exhibit spikes, sudden high or low prices, and, as
a consequence, the price distribution function is fat tailed. We think that the power function,
with power decay in the tails3, models the tails better than the exponential function. We differ
from both studies as we model, for reasons of mathematical convenience, the supply curve as a
2We have applied the exponential as well yielding similar results as to what we will present later.
3A characteristic of fat tailed distributions, see Huisman et al. [2001] among others
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function of quantity: the price charged given a specific quantity. This is in fact the inverse of the
supply curve as modeled by Barlow [2002] and Bozoianu et al. [2005]. As long as this inverse
exists, which we assume4, we believe that this assumption does not seriously influence our results.
We examine day-ahead prices: price of contracts that deliver power during one specific hour in
the following day5. Let pt(st) represent the supply curve: the price quoted on day t for delivery
of st MW of power during hour h in day t + 1
6. We use the subscript t in pt to stress that
we allow the structure of the supply curve to vary over time. The power supply curve that we,
based on Barlow [2002] suggest is
pt(st) = p¯ − at(s¯ − st)α, (1)
where p¯ is the maximum price that can be set and s¯ is maximum installed supply capacity. The
maximum price p¯ is an important feature as all power markets that we know apply a maximum
price that can be quoted. In Nord Pool, the maximum price is AC2,000 per MWh7. We think
it’s important to include this in the model as traders keep the maximum price in mind when
supplying their bids and offers. In the remainder, we set p¯ = 2,000. The maximum installed
supply capacity s¯ sets the physical limit of the market. It is likely that the maximum installed
capacity varies over time, both in the short run (as a consequence of variations in the amount
of water in hydro reservoirs for instance) and in the long run, but we assume it to be constant
in this paper. We have set the maximum supply capacity at s¯ = 100,000 MW, a volume that
has not been reached in the data sample that we use8.
The parameters at and α determine the structure of the supply curve. In order to have a supply
curve which is convex and increasing, we need to have that p
′
t(st) > 0 and p
′′
t (st) > 0. The first
and second order derivatives are p
′
t(st) = αat(s¯− st)α−1 and p
′
t(st) = −(α−1)αat(s¯− st)α−2.
It can be shown easily that the following restrictions yield an increasing and convex supply curve:
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and at ≥ 0.
The expressions for the first and second order derivatives show that both parameters at and α
determine the first and second order derivative, in other words the slope and convexity of the
supply curve. This is the reason why we choose the parameter α to be constant over time and
to make at time-varying. That is, time-variation in the slope and convexity is modeled through
at . We structure at to let the supply curve depend on fundamentals. Power in the Nord Pool
area is supplied from hydro, nuclear, thermal, wind sources and from imports / exports. As an
indication, on 26 October 2012, a total of 57,879 MW of power was produced between 9 am
4This assumption holds for the supply functions that Barlow [2002] and Bozoianu et al. [2005] use.
5We assume that hourly delivery contracts can be traded in day-ahead markets, which is common in power
markets.
6We don’t use h as an indicator for notational convenience.
7See http://www.nordpoolspot.com/How-does-it-work/Day-ahead-market-Elspot-/Curtailment/.
8We tried to estimate this number, but did not succeed. However, we assume that the coefficients α and at
will correct for the difference between the actual maximum supply capacity and our assumed value of 100,000
MW.
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and 10 am9. This quantity was produced by hydro (33,203 MW - 57.5%), nuclear (10,419 MW
- 18,0 %), thermal (9,781 MW - 16.9%), wind (3,846 MW - 6.6%) and not specified (630
MW - 1.1%). During this hour a quantity of 3,468 MW (6.0%) was exported. Nuclear and
thermal are the most dominant non-hydro power producers, having an approximately equal share
on 26 October 2012. Power is mostly imported during non peak hours from, for example, the
Netherlands where coal is main power source during non peak hours. To structure the supply
curve, we let at in equation 1 depend on hydro capacity for day t + 1 as expected on day t
and on the prices of coal (representing thermal) and emissions rights on day t as a consequence
of thermal production. Let rt represent the hydro power capacity, expected on day t, that is
available for production during hour h in day t + 110. So, rt = 10,000 MW means that one
expects at time t that a quantity of 10,000 MW can be produced from hydro sources during
hour h in day t + 1. Let pct be the price of coal known at time t that can be used for electricity
production during hour h in day t + 1. Lastly, let pet be the price of an emissions right contract
in order to be able to emit carbon during hour h in day t + 1. We assume that the parameter at
in the supply curve in equation 1 depends linearly on hydro capacity, coal and prices of carbon
emissions rights prices:
at = e
a0+ar rt+acp
c
t +aep
e
t . (2)
We use the exponential to have that at ≥ 0 one of the conditions for an increasing and convex
supply curve. The other condition is that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We model that by defining the parameter
b and apply the logit transformation α = 1
1+e−α∗ which keeps α between 0 and 1. Substituting
this equation in equation 1 yields the supply curve
pt(st) = p¯ − ea0+ar rt+acpct +aepet (s¯ − st)
1
1+e−α∗ . (3)
Barlow [2002] assumes that demand is price inelastic in the short term. This is a common
characteristic of electricity demand (see Borenstein [2002] among others) and we apply this
assumption as well. Let dt be the demand for the day-ahead contract that delivers power during
hour h in day t + 1. The market clearing price for which supply equals demand st = dt is
pt(dt) = p¯ − ea0+ar rt+acpct +aepet (s¯ − dt)
1
1+e−α∗ . (4)
This model describes the market clearing price as a function of demand, hydro capacity, the
price of coal and the price of rights to emit carbon. The goal of this paper is to examine the
effect of hydro capacity on power prices as this effect provides indirect insight in the effect of
adding wind and solar power supply on power prices. The market clearing model enables us to
identify the ceteris paribus effect through the estimate for the parameter ar , while correcting
for effects on power prices from the control variables demand, coal and emission rights. The
following section describes how we measured the different variables from Nord Pool data and
estimation issues.
9This information was retrieved from the website www.statnett.no.
10We chose for this definition as it matches the definition in the data from the Nord Pool market that we use
in this paper.
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3 Data and estimation issues
The market clearing price model 4 relates the price of electricity pt to demand dt , expected
hydro capacity rt , the price of coal p
c
t and the price of carbon emissions rights p
e
t . To estimate
the parameters in the model, we need observations about prices, demand and reservoir levels.
We collected data from Montel and Nord Pool Spot11. Nord Pool Spot runs the leading power
market in Europe, offering both day-ahead and intraday markets to its customers. The Nordic
countries deregulated their power markets in the early 1990s and brought their individual markets
together into a common Nordic market (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland). Estonia and
Lithuania deregulated their power markets in the late 2000s and are now also a part of the Nord
Pool Spot Market. Now that transmission capacity is in place between the Nordic countries, the
European continent (Cables and grids to Netherland and Germany) and the Baltics, the power
market covers large parts of northern Europe. This means that power from many different
sources - hydro, thermal, nuclear, wind and solar - enters the grid. There are also new planned
cables to UK and Germany that will even make the market more integrated for the coming years.
We use the electricity system spot price as the dependent variable. Prices are given as Euro/MWh
and recorded for each hour. Elspot is a day-ahead auction where power is traded for delivery
during the next day. The members place their orders, hour by hour, through Nord Pool Spot’s
web-based trading system, SESAM. Members can put their orders up to twelve days ahead while
the gate closure for the orders with the delivery next day is 12:00 CET. When all members have
submitted their orders, equilibrium between the aggregated supply and demand curves is estab-
lished for all bidding areas. The system and area prices are calculated and published normally
between 12:30 and 12:45 CET with a 3-minute warning. Settlement of all orders in Elspot is
based on area prices. The Elspot market is divided into several bidding areas. The available
transmission capacity may vary and congest the flow of electrical energy between the bidding
areas, and thereby different area prices are established.. Elspot calculates a system price based
on the sale and purchase orders disregarding the available transmission capacity between the
bidding areas in the Nordic market. The system price is the Nordic reference price for trading
and clearing of most financial contracts.
As a proxy for demand for day-ahead contracts dt we use expected consumption (at each hour).
We have realized consumption data, measured in MWh, recorder for every hour in our sample.
We have divided the consumption number by 10,000 to make them more comprehensible. We
have created expected consumption values from the actual consumption data from the (in-
sample) fit of the following model:
ct = v1ct−7 + v2 + (ct−2 − ct−9). (5)
In this equation, ct is the actual consumption during hour h in day t. The model assumes that
the actual consumption depends linearly on the actual consumption observed one week before,
to capture weekly seasonal effects. The coefficient v1 measures the magnitude of the weekly
11See www.montel.no and www.nordpoolspot.no for more detailed information.
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seasonal component. The second term in the right hand side measures the difference between
the actual consumption from two days ago and the actual consumption one week before that
day. It measures to what extend the consumption has increased or decreased over the week
and this growth is extended by the coefficient v2. We use ct−2 from two days ago and not
ct−1 from one day ago as when traders set the price at time t, for delivery at t + 1, the actual
consumption at day t is not yet available. The most recent number of actual consumption is the
level from one day ago t − 1. So, traders can only use information from day t − 1 to formulate
an expectation for delivery at time t + 1, hence the two days time lag. We have estimated the
parameters using least squares for each hour individually. We don’t provide all the individual hour
estimates12, but the average estimate over the 24 hours for v1 is 0.997 with standard deviation
equal to 0.001 and for v2 the average is 0.605 with standard deviation 0.059. The parameters
are all significantly different from zero.
Reservoir capacity rt is the capacity that can be produced in one hour from hydro sources in the
Nord Pool area, relating to water reservoir levels. These are weekly recordings and we have ap-
plied linear interpolation to translate the weekly number into a daily number. As a consequence,
we assume that hydro capacity is constant within the day. Reservoir information for each individ-
ual power station is obtained directly by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate.
We have obtained the prices of coal pct and emission rights p
e
t from Montel. They are the prices
of nearest delivery futures contracts. There are no hourly contracts, so we assume that the
same price applies to all hours within the day.
The data spans the period 1 January 2010 through 7 October 2012. We have 24,048 hourly
observations that we can use from this period of time. Table 1 provides summary statistics to
give an impression of the dataset that we use.
Note the high excess kurtosis of electricity prices (10.095). This is why we prefer the power
function, with power decay in the tails, over an exponential form. Our interest is to estimate
the parameters a0, ar , ac , ae , and α
∗ in equation 4. Introducing an IID(0,1) error term, the
regression equation that we apply is:
pt = p¯ − ea0+ar rt+acpct +aepet (s¯ − dt)
1
1+e−α∗ + σt . (6)
where σ is the standard deviation of the error term. The model is non-linear. We apply non-linear
least squares (NLS) to obtain the parameter estimates13.
12They are available upon request.
13We use the NLS procedure in Gretl (the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm).
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Table 1: Summary statistics of our dataset (hourly Nord Pool day-ahead prices and
consumption and weekly reservoir levels between 1 January 2010 and 7 October
2012).
prices consumption reservoir capacity
AC/MWh MWh/10,000 MWh/10,000
mean 44.147 4.396 4.753
median 44.530 4.262 4.833
minimum 1.4500 1.846 1.483
maximum 300.01 7.166 7.563
st.dev. 17.984 0.934 1.764
skewness 1.0535 0.469 -0.145
exc. kurtosis 7.075 -0.550 -1.146
The number of observations is 24,048.
4 Results
We have estimated the parameters in model 6 for the time-series of day-ahead price of each
individual hour. These estimates are in table 3. But we start our discussion with estimates
based on a pooled sample in order to provide insight in the fit of the model ’on average’ over the
hours. We did not correct for potential individual effects, such as hourly different coefficients,
which is perhaps not the econometrically best thing to do, but the estimates are consistent with
the hourly estimate such we are confident that the estimates from the pooled sample provide a
proper average view. Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for different (parameter) restricted
versions of the regression model 6 based on a pooled sample; all 24 time series stacked. The
first model is one in which we restricted the parameters ar , ac , ae to be zero. That is, we restrict
the supply curve to be constant. The second models allows the supply curve to depend on hydro
capacity. The third model allows for hydro capacity and the prices of coal and emissions rights
to structure the supply curve, i.e. the fully unrestricted model. We use scientific notation to
present the very small numbers. The estimate for ar in model 2, 2.110e-03, should be read as
0.002110.
All parameter estimates in table 2 are significantly different from zero. Model 1, the constant
supply curve model, explains 33% of the variation in day-ahead prices (in terms of adjusted r-
squared). The estimate for a0 is 7.528 and the estimate for α
∗ is -3.483, yielding an α estimate
equal to 0.030 (after applying the logit conversion). When we add the hydro capacity variable
to the model, i.e. we allow that hydro capacity structures the supply curve, we observe that the
adjusted r-squared increases from 33% (model 1) to 48% (model 2). The parameter estimates
don’t change much. We conclude from this that adding hydro capacity strongly improves the
fit of the model and that we are in favor of allowing time-variation in the supply curve to model
power prices. A time-varying supply curve explains power prices better, an observation already
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Table 2: NLS estimates of the parameters in the market clearing price model
pt(dt) = p¯ − ea0+ar rt+acpct +aepet (s¯ − dt)
1
1+e−α∗ + σt .
model 1 model 2 model 3
a0 7.528 7.529 7.548
(6.260e-04) (6.066e-04) (6.478e-04)
ar 2.110e-03 5.313e-04
(1.999e-05) (1.767e-05)
ac -3.046e-05
(2.171e-06)
ae -1.458e-03
(8.739e-06)
α∗ -3.483 -3.741 -3.525
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
α 0.030 0.023 0.029
R2adj 0.334 0.481 0.719
The number of observations is 24,048.
Heteroskedasticity robust t-ratios are in parentheses.
Scientific notation: 1e-03 = 0.001
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made by Bozoianu et al. [2005], than a constant supply curve, like in Barlow [2002]. The fit of
the model improves further when we add the prices of coal and emissions rights. Moving from
model 2 to model 3, we observe that the adjusted r-squared increases from 48% to 72%. The
market clearing price model that relates the day-ahead price to expected consumption, hydro
capacity and the price of coal and emission rights explains 72% of the variation in electricity
prices between January 2010 and October 2012 and from this we conclude that we can apply
this model on an hourly basis to examine the relation between prices and hydro capacity while
controlling for consumption and alternative production sources.
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for each individual hour. The results for hour 1 are ob-
tained from estimating the parameters using the time series of hour 1 delivery day-ahead prices
and the same applies to the other 23 hours. Each time series has 1,002 observations. Our first
observation is that the parameter estimates do not deviate much from those obtained from the
pooled model in table 2. The estimates for the constant a0 all hover closely around 7.5, as
in the pooled sample, indicating that the pooled sample does not suffer too much from hourly
differences (that we ignored in the pooled sample). Hence, we believe that the estimates from
the pooled sample provide a relatively accurate ’average’ view.
We start with discussing the fit of the model for each hour. The model fits best, in terms of
r-squared14, for hour 23 where it explains 80% of the variation in prices. The worst fit is for
hour 9 where the model explains 55% of the variation in prices (although we still think this is a
relatively high number). The reason for the difference in explanatory power becomes apparent
when we compare the actual prices and fitted values graphically. Figure 1 shows the time series
of actual and fitted prices for hour 9 (left) and hour 23 (right). Note the difference in the
y-scale. Hour 9 exhibits several price spikes, sudden high prices, for instance around observation
50 and 750, that cannot be explained by the model even though we selected the power function
model as we argued that it can better deal with fat-tails. These spikes occur as a results of
short term frictions between supply and demand, something that our model cannot deal with.
To deal with spikes, one would like to extend the model with some spike modeling component15,
but this is outside the scope of the paper. These spikes have not occurred in hour 23 during the
sample period which explains the better fit for that hour (although some deviations can be seen
in the graph for hour 23 as well). The model does quite well in fitted the trend and seasonality
for both; it’s the occurrence of spikes that explains the inferior fit in hour 9 compared to hour
23. As our goal is to examine the impact of hydro capacity on prices and not to examine spikes,
we think that the fit of the model is sufficient to draw conclusions about the ’average’ impact
of hydro capacity on day-ahead prices.
Table 3 shows that the estimates per hour are consistent in the sense that the signs of the
14We don’t use adjusted r-squared here as we do not compare different models as we did with the pooled sample
in the previous table.
15There is a vast literature on how to do this. We refer to Huisman [2009] and Janczura and Weron [2010]
among many others.
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Table 3: Hourly NLS estimates of the parameters in the market clearing price model
pt(dt) = p¯ − ea0+ar rt+acpct +aepet (s¯ − dt)
1
1+e−α∗ + σt .
hour a0 ar ac ae α
∗ α R2
1 7.545 6.519e-04 -3.938e-05 -1.417e-03 -3.496 0.029 0.772
(6.065e-03) (2.060e-04) (2.188e-05) (7.920e-05) (0.115)
2 7.539 6.267e-04 -3.554e-05 -1.384e-03 -3.393 0.033 0.749
(6.186e-03) (2.209e-04) (2.262e-05) (8.505e-05) (0.101)
3 7.535 5.912e-04 -3.442e-05 -1.358e-03 -3.328 0.035 0.733
(6.232e-03) (2.339e-04) (2.312e-05) (8.952e-05) (0.104)
4 7.534 5.747e-04 -3.520e-05 -1.349e-03 -3.295 0.036 0.728
(6.202e-03) (2.378e-04) (2.356e-05) (9.329e-05) (0.101)
5 7.534 5.754e-04 -3.626e-05 -1.349e-03 -3.305 0.035 0.738
(5.969e-03) (2.306e-04) (2.344e-05) (9.323e-05) (0.097)
6 7.541 5.462e-04 -4.023e-05 -1.366e-03 -3.410 0.032 0.742
(5.406e-03) (2.074e-04) (2.263e-05) (8.640e-05) (0.094)
7 7.551 5.170e-04 -3.559e-05 -1.423e-03 -3.582 0.027 0.749
(4.566e-03) (1.868e-04) (2.197e-05) (7.913e-05) (0.087)
8 7.543 3.584e-04 -2.537e-05 -1.409e-03 -3.438 0.031 0.620
(7.119e-03) (2.019e-04) (2.511e-05) (1.092e-04) (0.120)
9 7.534 2.724e-04 -1.048e-05 -1.429e-03 -3.298 0.036 0.554
(8.905e-03) (2.222e-04) (3.003e-05) (1.306e-04) (0.130)
10 7.542 3.473e-04 -1.479e-05 -1.481e-03 -3.419 0.032 0.633
(7.249e-03) (1.984e-04) (2.710e-05) (1.113e-04) 0.118
11 7.548 4.046e-04 -1.748e-05 -1.516e-03 -3.528 0.029 0.717
(5.777e-03) (1.812e-04) (2.451e-05) (9.715e-05) 0.103
12 7.549 4.161e-04 -2.226e-05 -1.543e-03 -3.544 0.028 0.730
(5.563e-03) (1.816e-04) 2.325e-05) (9.616e-05) (0.107)
13 7.552 4.692e-04 -2.462e-05 -1.538e-03 -3.591 0.027 0.757
(5.228e-03) (1.751e-04) (2.253e-05) (8.934e-05) (0.103)
14 7.552 4.878e-04 -2.816e-05 -1.524e-03 -3.598 0.027 0.766
(5.103e-03) (1.728e-04) (2.208e-05) (8.530e-05) (0.101)
15 7.553 4.813e-04 -2.907e-05 -1.529e-03 -3.596 0.027 0.769
(4.945e-03) (1.740e-04) (2.178e-05) (8.440e-05) (0.099)
16 7.553 4.641e-04 -2.994e-05 -1.535e-03 -3.597 0.027 0.781
(4.583e-03) (1.741e-04) (2.087e-05) (8.410e-05) (0.093)
17 7.548 3.441e-04 -2.724e-05 -1.572e-03 -3.484 0.030 0.746
(4.891e-03) (1.877e-04) (2.113e-05) (9.918e-05) (0.095)
18 7.538 1.719e-04 -1.435e-05 -1.586e-03 -3.321 0.035 0.646
(7.092e-03) (2.080e-04) (2.303e-05) (1.262e-04) (0.112)
19 7.543 3.022e-04 -1.006e-05 -1.579e-03 -3.414 0.032 0.685
(6.859e-03) (1.933e-04) (2.524e-05) (1.096e-04) (0.113)
20 7.553 4.820e-04 -2.999e-05 -1.526e-03 -3.621 0.026 0.740
(5.543e-03) (1.686e-04) (2.286e-05) (9.069e-05) (0.110)
21 7.558 5.931e-04 -3.898e-05 -1.482e-03 -3.734 0.023 0.774
(4.772e-03) (1.631e-04) (2.115e-05) (8.080e-05) (0.108)
22 7.559 6.678e-04 -4.135e-05 -1.466e-03 -3.775 0.022 0.797
(4.603e-03) (1.68e-04) (2.109e-05) (7.752e-05) (0.110)
23 7.558 7.071e-04 -4.196e-05 -1.477e-03 -3.757 0.023 0.803
(4.806e-03) (1.744e-04) (2.027e-05) (7.359e-05) (0.118)
24 7.552 7.434e-04 -4.693e-05 -1.417e-03 -3.629 0.026 0.796
(5.194e-03) (1.853e-04) (2.014e-05) (7.314e-05) (0.113)
The number of observations is 1,002.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Scientific notation: 1e-03 = 0.001
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Figure 1: Actual (gray thin line) and fitted (black thick line) prices for hour 9 (left)
and hour 23 (right).
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estimates are the same for the parameters for all hours. The estimates for α range between
0.022 and 0.036 (note that the model forces α to be within 0 and 1 to obtain an increasing
and convex supply curve). The signs for the prices of coal and emissions rights are all negative.
This implies that an increase in these prices, increases the price of power as the exponential in
the market clearing price model 4 comes with a negative sign (we explain this in more detail in
the discussion about hydro capacity below).
We proceed with discussion the main topic of this paper. We question what the effect is
of increasing the share of low marginal costs power production to the supply curve on the
market clearing price of electricity. We examine this indirectly using data from the Nord Pool
market arguing that an the marginal costs of hydro production (the value of the option to delay
production) decreases when hydro capacity increases. The hypothesis that we test is therefore
that an increase in hydro capacity should lead to a decrease in the day-ahead price of electricity
(while correcting for consumption and prices of alternative production). Let’s focus on hour
1. The hydro capacity parameter ar estimate is 6.519e-04 (0.0006519) with standard error
equal to 2.060e-04 (0.0002060). The t-statistic equals 3.165, hence we conclude that this
estimate is significantly different from zero and as its sign is positive, we conclude that the
estimate is significantly higher than zero. We infer from the market clearing price model 4 that
a positive estimate for ar combined with the negative sign before the exponential leads to a
combined negative effect between hydro capacity and power prices, therefore being in line with
the hypothesis. More formally, the first order derivative of the market clearing price to hydro
capacity is:
dp
dr
= −area0+ar rt+acpct +aepet (s¯ − dt)
1
1+e−α∗ . (7)
As the exponential is positive and as (s¯−dt) is always positive, recall that we assumed that s¯, the
maximum supply capacity is set sufficiently higher than the maximum consumption, it becomes
clear that the first order derivative in equation 7 is negative when ar is positive. Hence, we
conclude for hour 1 that an increase in hydro capacity reduces the day-ahead power price. Table
3 shows that the signs of ar are positive for all hours although not always significantly different
from zero. This is the case for hours 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, and 19. These are all hours in which
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the fit of the model is worse due to spikes. Table 2 with the estimates from the pooled sample
shows that the estimate is positive and highly significant ’on average’. Combined we conclude
that an increase in hydro capacity lowers power prices and we attribute this to a reduction in
the value of the option to delay production, being the marginal opportunity costs, when hydro
capacity increases. An increase in hydro capacity due to increased reservoir levels is similar to
adding more low marginal costs production such as wind and solar to the power supply curve.
We therefore conclude that an increase in the share of wind and solar power production will
lower the wholesale market price of power. We immediate note here that this result is indirect
as we draw our conclusion from studying hydro capacity, but we think that it contributes to
the currently limited amount of empirical results on the impact of low marginal costs renewable
energy on power prices.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides indirect empirical evidence for the impact of an increased share of low
marginal costs renewable power sources such as wind and solar on day-ahead power prices. With
indirect we mean that we have examined this effect not directly by relating power prices to the
share of renewables in a market, but indirectly through the change in the marginal costs from
hydro production in the Nord Pool market. We think that this adds insight as the advantage
of this method is that we can draw conclusions from a mature market whereas the alternative
approach uses data from markets that change due to the increase of renewables. The disad-
vantage of the method is that it is indirect, but combined with the relatively scarce empirical
evidence on the impact of renewables on energy prices, we think that our results strengthens
the view obtained from previous theoretical and empirical studies that an increase in the share
of renewables (wind and solar) will lower the market price of power.
The second contribution of this paper is that we develop a market clearing price model by mod-
eling the supply curve of power. This is done before, but not through a power function, in the
sense that we allow the structure of the curve to vary over time depending on fundamentals
such as hydro capacity and the prices of alternative power sources, and dealing with maximum
prices which apply to all power markets that we know.
With our result, we strengthen support for the view that an increase in wind and solar supply
lowers the power price. The renewable energy revolution is one in which, economically, fossil
fuel power sources (positive marginal costs) have to compete with renewable power sources (low
marginal costs) within the same market place. This effect strengthened with more (small scale)
players entering the markets (producers with a few wind mills or solar power panels) increases
competition and shifts the supply curve to the right, explaining the reduction in power prices
due to an increase in renewables. Thus, an increase in sustainable energy sources with low
marginal costs sources such as wind and solar will decrease power prices. This is good news for
consumers, but it increases the costs of sustainable energy policies such as feed-in tariffs and
at the same time lowers revenues and profits for power producers in case governments would
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abandon such policies. This makes sustainable energy a less attractive investment opportunity
and will lower the supply of private capital for sustainable energy investments. This effect makes
the economic and policy support for renewable energy less sustainable. Policy makers have to
account for this if they want to stimulate a sustainable growth of sustainable energy supply.
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